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The purpose of this article is to provide an explanation for the contradictory findings 
about the links between private family businesses (FBs) and organisational performance. 
The paper suggests that lone founder firms determine the results by explaining the 
comparative performance of different private FBs and NFBs.  In addition, we develop a 
parsimonious typology of private FBs that exploits the interactions of the components of 
family involvement to show that firms that achieve to avoid or minimize traditional 
agency conflicts tend to outperform the firms that do not. It appears that the use of 
ownership dispersion as a governance mechanism shepherds and monitors performance 
progress, and among FBs the conflict between owners and managers seems to be more 
costly than the conflict between large and minority shareholders.  













                                                 




Lone founders, types of private family firms and firm performance 
1. Introduction 
Family businesses (FBs) represent the majority of firms around the world, and the research 
focusing on the implications of family involvement in business ventures is growing 
exponentially (Bennedsen, 2007; Chrisman and Chua, 2004; Sirmon, 2008; Steier,). On the 
other hand, performance is an essential indicator of the organisational success and 
competitive advantage of firms. If firms are able to identify the factors that determine 
improved performance, they could take advantage of their specific features. Thus, strategy 
scholars have considered financial performance to be an essential variable of interest (Nag, 
Hambrick and Chen, 2007). Consequently, the literature on business strategy and financial 
economics has paid more attention to the analysis of performance in FBs (Mazzi, 2011). 
Many studies have attempted to analyse the relationship between family involvement and 
performance, comparing the performance of family and non-family businesses (NFBs) 
(among others Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Arosa, Iturralde and Maseda, 2010; Cucculelli 
and Miccuci, 2008; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). However, most of the previous research 
has shown conflicting results, which have been even more confused within FBs (Sharma 
and Carney, 2012). Several literature review papers about the financial performance of FBs 
have recently been published (Amit and Villalonga, in press; Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; 
Mazzi, 2011; Stewart and Hitt, 2012), considering that there are different factors (such as 
the different definitions of FBs) that can affect the findings that are obtained. There has 
been a question of whether to include founder-led firms in FB samples or simply that FBs 
cannot be viewed as homogeneous entities, which may have been the cause for the 
contradictory results. FBs have been considered to be “black boxes” (Creed, 2000), which 
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is a concept that fails to recognise which family factors lead to high performance. As the 
findings have been highly sensitive to the ways in which FBs are defined (Sacristán-
Navarro, Gómez-Ansón and Cabeza-García, 2011), several researchers have suggested the 
need to create typologies to test them empirically (Chrisman, Chua and Kellermanns, 2009; 
Frank et al. 2010; Sharma and Nordqvist, 2008; Weshead and Howorth, 2006; Westhead 
and Howorth, 2007). Additionally, the conducted review reveals that most of the previous 
research on the performance of FBs focused on large listed firms (Mazzi, 2011; Zellweger, 
Nason and Nordqvist, 2012), and there is limited available evidence that pertains to the 
performance of privately held firms (Sharma and Carney, 2012). Thus, different empirical 
definitions of family involvement have led to contradictory results in the literature about 
the links between private FBs and organisational performance (James, 1999), and calls for 
additional studies have been made (Steier, Chrisman and Chua, 2004).  
It appears obvious that there are agency problems in FBs and that traditional assumptions 
and governance mechanisms work differently whether firms are privately and family 
owned or family managed (Shulze et al., 2001). Consequently, we strive to answer the 
following research questions on how lone founder and family involvement impact agency 
costs in private firms and their consequences in performance. 
The first question we raise is the following: Does the lone founder effect exist in private 
firms? The research question tests if lone founder firms outperform FBs because agency 
costs among lone founder firms are lower than between FBs. The second question analyses 
whether family involvement increase or decrease performance. The classic owner-manager 
conflict –agency problem I- (Jensen and Mecking, 1976) would predict a positive effect on 
performance of family management. On the other hand, FBs with concentrated ownership 
may extract benefits at the expense of small shareholders –agency problem II- (Villalonga 
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and Amid, 2006). We consider the former agency costs I and II as traditional ones. Besides, 
FBs deal with specific agency costs and benefits. FBs may benefit from long-term 
contracting, family expertise, commitment or altruism (Gomez-Mejía, Núñez-Nickel and 
Gutiérrez, 2001; James, 1999). On the other hand, FBs might have to cope with agency 
costs that stem from taking advantage of the firm´s assets, fewer skilled candidates, 
increasingly complex conflicts and asymmetrical altruism (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Hendry, 2002). In this regard, if lone founders and different types of FBs are analysed as a 
uniform entity, the findings are likely to be inconclusive because firm performance may 
indeed be sensitive to how each type of firm tackles the pros and cons that have been 
identified above. 
We try to answer the former research questions using a sample of 3,525 private firms in 
Spain. First, we assess the sensitivity of the performance results to remove lone founders 
from the FB category. We utilise two univariate techniques to determine if lone founders 
yield better or worse performances than private FBs; to the best of our knowledge, no study 
has investigated this question. Second, we illustrate 5 theoretical types of private FBs, 
depending on the presence or absence of the agency problem I and II and addressing a 
specific treatment for lone founders. Furthermore, we apply an exploratory factor analysis 
to empirically validate the expected behaviour of lone founders and the types of FBs that 
are under consideration. We show that whether FBs are better or worse performers depends 
on how the cope with traditional agency costs using ownership dipersion and family 
management. 
In short, this paper identifies outperformer firms to maximise investment returns, and it 
encourages underperformers to move towards the particular governance structures of 
higher-performing private FBs. We demonstrate that the governance profiles of lone 
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founders and each type of private FB may help academics and practitioners to better 
understand how each type of firm handles agency benefits and costs and, as a consequence, 
justifies the sensitivity of performance results to the natures of different firms. 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we summarise the empirical results about 
the lone founder effect and family involvement on performance. We devote section 3 to 
theory and hypotheses and section 4 to data and variables. The research method and our 
main results are addressed in section 5, and finally, our main conclusions are presented in 
section 6. 
2. The lone founder effect and family involvement on performance 
In line with Miller et al. (2007), we define an FB as one in which multiple members of the 
same family, who are related by blood or marriage, are involved as owners, managers or 
members of the board, either contemporaneously or over time. Similarly, we differentiate 
between lone founder firms, in which, beyond the founder, there are not other family 
relatives in the business, and FBs, in which there are multiple owners, managers or 
directors from the same family.  
Many studies have considered FBs as firms that only involve a lone founder, with no 
involvement by any of   the   founder’s   relatives serving as owners, managers or directors. 
Miller et al. (2007) summarises a catalogue of worthwhile papers that chose this option and 
that, consequently, could not demonstrate whether firm performance stemmed from a lone 
founder or family effects. Miller et al. (2007) were able to separate both types of 
performance effects in public firms and concluded that only businesses with a lone founder 
outperform the other types of firms.   
On the other hand, FB scholars have attempted to classify different types of FBs using 
several criteria. One of the most used systems was developed by Sharma (2002), who 
6 
 
identified 72 categories of FBs, depending on the extent of family involvement in 
ownership and management. Handler (1989) added governance and plans for 
transgenerational continuity or succession as two other components of family involvement. 
Nevertheless, we will focus on two factors—ownership and management—to determine the 
influence of each factor on performance, both in isolation and conjointly. To that end, we 
measure family involvement as a typology (García-Castro and Sharma, 2011). 
Most of the research on the relationship between family involvement in ownership and 
performance has been performed on listed companies. Some of the research has confirmed 
that FBs offer superior performance (Martínez, Stöhr and Quiroga, 2007; Maury 2006; 
Sraer and Thesmar, 2007). However, it seems that the relationship between performance 
and ownership is not linear. In particular, Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Le Breton-Miller, 
Miller and Lester (2011) suggest that family ownership positively affects firm performance, 
exhibiting an inverted U-shape relationship. However, while some scholars have found a 
negative influence of family ownership on performance (Morck, Strangeland and Yeung, 
2000), others have found hardly any differences between FBs and NFBs (Chrisman, Chua 
and Litz, 2004); Sraer and Thesmar (2007) have even confirmed that NFBs performed 
better than family owned firms. With regard to the relationship between family 
involvement in management and performance in public firms, the results are also mixed. 
Whereas Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Maury (2006) suggest that family management 
has a positive effect on profitability, other authors such as Barth, Gulbrandsen and Schone 
(2005), Filatotchev, Zhang, and Piesse (2011), Morck, Strangeland, and Yeung (2000), 
Pérez-González (2006) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) found that firms with family 
members who serve as managers underperform firms that are managed by outside 
managers. To summarise, the previous research has focused on public firms, and it has 
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highlighted the concept that family involvement generally has a positive effect on 
performance, as has been tested by Steward and Hitt (2012) in a recent paper review 
analysis, in which two-thirds of the papers that were analysed found positive effects. 
However, the main limitation of the former studies is that they have focused on publicly 
traded firms, despite the fact that most firms are private firms.  
Nevertheless, there are studies that have addressed private firms. Specifically, with respect 
to family involvement in ownership, Arosa, Iturralde, and Maseda (2010), Castillo and 
Wakefield (2006), Sciascia and Mazzola (2008) and Weshead and Howorth (2006) were 
not able to confirm a relationship between ownership concentration and firm profitability. 
However, Sirmon et al. (2008) found that family influenced firms maintain higher levels of 
R&D investments and internationalisation, and thus, they enjoy higher performance. 
However, this positive influence is lost when higher levels of ownership are held by family 
members. Regarding family involvement in management, Daily and Dollinger (1991), 
Weshead and Howorth (2006), Blanco-Mazagatos, de Quevedo-Puente, and Castrillo 
(2007) did not observe significant differences on financial performance measures between 
family and non-family managed firms, while Sciascia and Mazzola (2008) analysed 
whether there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between family management and 
performance. In summary, although the previous research that has focused on private firms 
reveals that family involvement generally has an insignificant or negative effect on 
performance, as the work of Steward and Hitt (2012) has confirmed, additional research is 
required on the effects of family on firm performance because they have not been tested 
based on a clearly defined relationship. This research line is especially needed within non-




3. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
These former non-homogeneous results lead us to apply agency theory, as a theoretical 
framework, to explain how lone founders and FBs may be different not only with respect to 
private non-family businesses but from each other. Specifically, we propose that the 
arguments that have been made to distinguish lone founders and different types of private 
FBs might be useful to explain the above-noted inconsistent results.  
3.1. Lone founders’ involvement and performance 
Several studies have suggested that lone founders achieve higher performance than the 
other FBs in public firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Barontini and Caprio, 2006; Chu, 
2011; Le Breton-Miller, Miller and Lester, 2011; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Miller et al. 
(2007), removing lone founder firms from the FB classification, concluded that FBs did not 
outperform in their market valuations, but lone founder businesses outperformed in their 
market valuations. The previous results are usually explained by the fact that lone founders 
are entrepreneurial orientated, less risk-averse than successive generations and more 
inclined to develop strategies (Steward and Hitt, 2012). Values such as discipline, humility, 
piety and self-sacrifice have been demonstrated by the founders of long-term successful 
businesses (James, 2006). Their desire to pass the business on to future generations may 
also foster an attitude of stewardship towards a business and its stakeholders (Le Breton-
Miller and Miller, 2009). From an agency perspective, as Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) 
proposed, a sole-owner managed firm is a zero-agency cost-base case. As we want a zero 
agency cost base case to serve as the reference point of comparison for all other cases of 
family ownership and management structures, we restrict our analysis to lone founder firms 
owned by a sole owner-manager. A firm that is solely owned by a single owner-manager by 
its definition has no traditional agency costs. A   sole   owner’s   incentive to consume 
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perquisites is null, as his share of the firm´s profits is the maximum. It is an extreme case of 
ownership and management structures because the manager owns 100 per cent of the firm. 
Moreover, he is free from family succession issues and kinship squabbles (Miller et al., 
2007).  
The above literature overview of public firms shows that the inclusion of a lone founder 
firm in the definition of an FB determines the conclusions that are obtained when FBs and 
NFBs performance is compared. To the best of our knowledge and belief, no study has 
investigated whether lone founders would contribute to the improvement or diminishment 
of performance when private family and lone founder firms are included into a single 
category. We examine the impact of lone founder involvement on firm performance 
addressing a specific issue: does the lone founder effect also exist in private firms?  
This discussion suggests the following hypotheses: 
H1. Lone founder firms outperform private family firms 
3.2. The agency cost of family involvement in ownership and performance 
Although agency problems might arise between any two groups of stakeholders, the 
literature that has applied agency theory to the study of performance in FBs has 
concentrated on: agency costs that arise from the separation of ownership and management 
(agency problem I) and agency costs that arise from a conflict of interest between majority 
and minority shareholders (agency problem II). Family ownership might lead to a reduction 
of the effect of classic conflict as described by Villalonga and Amit (2006) as Agency 
problem I (Berle and Means 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Family businesses have 
more long-term vision, which allows them to focus on investment opportunities that 
contribute to maximising long-run returns (Bertrand, 2006) and to ensure the passing of the 
firm to familial descendants (James, 1999). This long-term perspective usually promotes 
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long-term contracting, which could alleviate moral hazard problems that stem from a 
divergence between the interest of principals and agents (Gomez-Mejía et al., 2001). 
Similarly, as a family´s wealth is closely linked to firm feasibility, majority family 
shareholders have strong incentives to reduce managerial expropriation (Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985). Furthermore, a family’s reputation that has been built over a long period of 
time can bring positive economic consequences for the firm in comparison with non-FBs in 
which managers and directors frequently change (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). The loyalty 
and trust that is allegedly shared by owners, employees and customers also may improve 
the performance of FBs (James, 1999), and the cumbersome and costly monitoring of 
organisational mechanisms may be avoided. On the other hand, family members can take 
advantage of a firm's assets to meet their own needs (Haynes et al., 1999). In other words, 
families might expropriate firm wealth (Shleifer and Summers, 1988) at the expense of 
minority shareholders, which Villalonga and Amit (2006) refer to as Agency problem II. In 
this context of firms with a high ownership concentration, agency costs might take the form 
of dividends and extraordinary remuneration or the entrenchment of the family 
management team, which may reduce firm profitability (Ang, Cole and Lin, 2010). 
Additionally, Bertrand and Schoar (2006) observed that this sort of expropriation of 
resources can also be conducted by controlling owners at the expense of other family 
members within privately held FBs (Steward and Hitt, 2012). Moreover, Morck, 
Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) and Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) suggest that high levels of 
ownership concentration may lead to inefficient investments. Le Breton Miller and Miller 
(2009, 1174) summarise the familial repercussions that are suggested by the owner-owner 
agency perspective as follows:   “(1) underinvestment in the business and thus failure to 
develop or renew core competencies; (2) centralised, hierarchical organisations; (3) 
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cronyism or insularity in relating to external stakeholders; and (4) inferior growth, financial 
returns,  and  market  valuations”. 
3.3. The agency costs of family involvement in management and performance  
Agency theory has often been used to argue that FB governance is more efficient than that 
of NFB because there are fewer agency costs due to the alignment of goals between agents 
and principals, particularly in widely held firms (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel and 
Gutierrez, 2001). Otherwise, an FB that is run by non-family CEOs could create agency 
problems due to ownership and management being in different hands. Thus, an alignment 
between owners and managers ensures effective decision making that can maximise a 
family’s wealth (Zahra, 2005). In addition, a family CEO can bring expertise (Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1988), a superior commitment (Ward, 1988), identification with the 
firm (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997), long-term focus and farsighted investments 
(Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006), lower executive compensation (Gomez-Mejia, 
Larraza-Kintana and Makri, 2003) and lower average wages (Sraer and Thesmar, 2007), 
among other benefits, which would trigger an even lower agency problem I. Similarly, 
altruism could foster communication and cooperation within an FB, thereby decreasing the 
information asymmetries among family agents and increasing the use of informal 
agreements (Daily and Dollinger, 1992; Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino, 2001). 
On the other hand, the election of a family member as a CEO might exclude more skilled 
candidates (Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer, 2003) and cause resentment among non-family 
executives (Anderson and Reeb, 2003), which not only prevents a firm from proper growth 
but also creates negative incentives throughout the organisation (Bertrand, 2006). Hendry 
(2002) conceptualised these problems as being agency-related and arising from honest 
incompetence. In this case, adverse selection occurs if a principal contracts an agent who is 
12 
 
less able, committed, industrious, or ethical, or whose interests are less compatible than the 
principal expects (Chrisman, Chua and Litz, 2004). Moreover, family managers can cause 
conflicts that are more complex between those who lead a firm and other family owners. 
Moral hazards, as Chrisman, Chua and Litz (2004) describe, involve the commission or 
omission of family managements’   actions in the interest of the agent but which are also 
detrimental to the principal. A CEO’s  ability   to   effectively  monitor   and  discipline   family  
agents is reduced (Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino, 2003). Inter-generational squabbles, 
conflicts and nepotism may detract from financial performance (Kaye 1991; Gomez-Mejia, 
Nunez-Nickel and Gutierrez, 2001). 
3.4. The combined effects of family involvement in ownership and management on 
performance 
As the definitions of an FB have varied widely across studies, the literature has presented 
mixed and contradictory results when it has compared the performance of family and non-
FBs. Therefore, we firmly believe that it would be advisable to develop a typology of FBs 
to obtain more robust conclusions about FB performance. We suggest that not all FBs are 
alike because of the large diversity of effects on performance that are derived from the 
ways in which each type of FB addresses agency costs and benefits. We have determined 
that different FB types rely on the function of family involvement as an internal control 
mechanism in corporate governance. We consider the role of family involvement in 
ownership and management in mitigating owner-owner and owner-manager conflicts.  
As represented in table 1, we assume that family ownership and management would have 
both positive and negative effects on performance that are related to traditional agency 
costs that are embedded in every type of firm. The traditional agency costs for firms could 
be controlled through mechanisms such as family dispersed ownership and family 
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management. However, we should also take into account other specific features of FBs, 
such as asymmetrical and symmetrical altruism, which might increase or decrease the 
effects of agency problem I. However, the net effect on performance of these types of FB 
characteristics cannot be determined conceptually in advance. The question of what type of 
FB will determine higher or lower total agency costs and how such costs rate in comparison 
with agency problems that are handled by NFBs can be empirically determined. Therefore, 
we will circumscribe our theoretical approach to the traditional versions of agency 
problems I and II that are present in FBs and NFBs. We can assume, as Villalonga and 
Amit (2006) do, that having a family CEO eliminates the conflict between owners and 
managers (traditional agency problem I) and that having a more dispersed family ownership 
reduces the possibility of expropriation by minority shareholders (traditional agency 
problem II).  
INSERT TABLE 1 
According to the presence or absence of the traditional agency problems I and II, and 
addressing a specific treatment for lone founders, given the absence of any family 
involvement, we yield a useful classification into seven types of firms (figure 1): 
  Lone founder. These firms do not have agency problems. Agency problem I is avoided 
because the agent and the principal are the same person. Agency problem II is avoided 
because the possibility of expropriating minority shareholders does not exist.  
 Co-preneurial FB. These firms might not have agency problem I. Agency problem II is 
depreciated because the possibility of expropriating minority shareholders is actually 
minimised. There might only be two shareholders. 
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 Solely Family Run FB. FBs with more concentrated family ownership and management. 
These firms might not have agency problem I, but they have an increased possibility of 
having agency problem II. 
 Dispersed Non-Professional FB. FBs with more dispersed family ownership and family 
management. These firms might not have agency problem I, and they may reduce the 
possibility of having agency problem II. 
 Dispersed Professional FB. FBs with more dispersed family ownership and non-family 
management. These firms might have agency problem I, but they have reduced the 
possibility of having agency problem II.  
 Concentrated Professional FB. FBs with more concentrated family ownership and 
professional management. These firms have both agency problems. 
 Non-family business. Overall, NFBs have to cope with higher monitoring costs because 
they usually use professional management. They may have agency problem I and 
agency problem II.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 
Figure 1 presents three groups that we can now analyse and compare as to their expected 
performance. Lone founders, Co-preneurial FBs and Dispersed Non-Professional FBs 
(Group I) would be expected to perform better than the other firm types because they have 
no agency costs to bear (Lone founder) or they sustain lower agency costs I and II (Co-
preneurial FB and Dispersed Non-Professional FBs). On the other hand, Concentrated 
Professional FBs (Group III) will incur significant agency costs. They will experience a 
higher incidence of agency problems I and II.  As a consequence, we could postulate that 
this type of FB will obtain the worst performance. Finally, Solely Family Run FBs and 
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Dispersed Professional FBs (Group II) only have to address one agency problem. The 
former may cope with the expropriation of wealth by fewer shareholders, and the latter 
might need to tackle costs that are associated with a professional manager’s rules. 
Therefore, they are expected to outperform Concentrated Professional FBs (Group III) and 
to perform more poorly than lone founders, Co-preneurials and Dispersed Non-
Professional FBs (Group I). It is more difficult to predict whether Solely Family Run FBs 
has a performance advantage or disadvantage compared with Dispersed Professional FBs. 
The answer to this question is scant and inconclusive because we do not know a priori what 
type of agency problem is more detrimental to firm performance. Finally, NFBs are 
supposed to cope with agency problem I, and, depending on their level of ownership 
concentration, they will have to address a higher or lower incidence of agency problem II. 
Therefore, if the NFB sample contains a higher percentage of concentrated ownership 
firms, they will tend to be in the same group as Concentrated Professional FBs (Group III); 
however, if it contains a higher proportion of dispersed ownership firms, it would likely be 
in group III, next to Dispersed Professional FBs (Group II). 
This discussion suggests the following hypotheses: 
H2a. Group I (Lone founders, Co-preneurial FBs and Dispersed Non-Professional FB) will 
perform better than Group II (Solely Family run FB, Dispersed Professional FB and 
Dispersed NFBs) and Group III (Concentrated professional FBs and Concentrated NFBs) 
 
H2b. Solely Family run FB and Dispersed Professional FB (Group II) will perform better 
than Concentrated Professional FBs (Grupo III) 
 
4. Data and variables 
4.1. The data and typology of FBs 
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The financial data have been selected from the 2009 Spanish database SABI (Analysis 
System of Spanish Balance Sheets). To calculate certain variables, we extended the 
information that we used to 2008. This database collects annual balance sheet records from 
official registers for Spanish firms. The data exclude companies that did not have available 
financial information for the period 2002-2007; firms that were affected by special 
situations, such as bankruptcy proceedings; firms that were closing down, in liquidation or 
inactive and financial and insurance firms. Micro-companies were also excluded because 
their financial information is often not reliable, and they are excessively dispersed, which 
makes them unsuitable for statistical methods. After this process of scrutiny, SABI included 
115,695 firms that fulfilled the above-stated conditions. To reduce heterogeneity, we 
stratified the sample by size (small, medium and large) and by industry (construction, 
services and manufacturing). In total, we worked with 3,525 companies (we started with 
500 firms by stratum and removed firms with atypical data). The data refer to the period 
from 2006 through 2007. Our sample consisted of  businesses whose ownership structures 
were as concentrated in FBs as it was in NFBs (Blanco-Mazagatos, de Quevedo-Puente and 
Castrillo, 2007). This fact allowed us to distinguish between the effect of concentrated-
dispersed ownership and the specific influence of family involvement. 
The firms were classified according to family ties, the legal nature of the firm, ownership, 
control, direction, ownership concentration and professionalism (López-Gracia and 
Sánchez-Andújar, 2007). To look for family ties, we took advantage of the Spanish custom, 
whereby two surnames are given, one from each parent. Therefore surname coincidence in 
two internal stakeholders (shareholders, CEO and directors) who do not belong to the same 
family is unlikely. The surnames of all of the internal stakeholders or interest groups that 
were involved in the management and governance of a business were compared, along with 
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the shareholders, in a similar way to Arosa, Iturralde and Maseda (2010), Gomez-Mejia, 
Nunez-Nickel and Gutierrez (2001) and Pérez-González (2006). As with Castillo and 
Wakefield (2006), we used these data because no better data source of FBs was publicly 
available to identify lone founder firms and several different types of FBs. Specifically, 
there is no official database of FBs in Spain; therefore, this study is an important effort that 
sheds light on the particularly private Spanish firm landscape. In the end, seven different 
classes of firms were identified as being operative: 
Type 1. Lone founders. As a proxy of a lone founder, we consider that a firm in which the 
same person holds the status of sole shareholder, director and CEO to be equivalent to a 
lone founder firm. 
Type 2. Co-preneurial FBs. Shareholders, directors and CEO are positions that are held by 
just two people of the opposite sex and with different surnames. They are most likely to 
have family ties by marriage because all married women keep their maiden name after 
marrying in Spain. 
Type 3. Solely Family Run FBs. There is a coincidence of surnames among shareholders 
and CEO and/or directors, and some shareholders own more than 25% of the shares. In this 
case, someone in the family runs the company. 
Type 4. Dispersed Non-Professional FBs, where there is a coincidence of surnames between 
interest groups, and no shareholder owns more than 25% of the shares.  
Type 5. Dispersed Professional FBs, where there is a coincidence of surnames between the 
internal stakeholders, and no shareholder owns more than 25% of the shares. In addition, a 
non-family member is the CEO of the firm. 
Type 6. Concentrated Professional FBs. The surnames of the shareholders and/or the 
directors are the same, but those surnames do not match those of the CEO, and some 
18 
 
shareholders own more than 25% of the shares. A non-family CEO runs the company. 
Type -1. Non FBs. We include general and limited partnerships, firms whose last owner was 
a business, and those firms in which there is no coincidence of surnames among the last 
shareholders, directors or CEO (internal group).  
INSERT TABLE 2 
From table 2, our analysis suggests that lone founder firms and FBs represent 26.41% and 
27.21% of the studied sample, respectively, while NFBs represent 46.38% of the whole 
sample. By types of FB, Solely Family Run FB firms are the most numerous group, 
representing 70.39% of FBs. Co-preneurial is the second largest type of FB (15.12%). 
Concentrated Professional FB is the third largest type of FB (11.26%). Dispersed Non-
Professional FB is the smallest group, representing 3.02% of the whole sample of FBs. 
Finally, the number of members who are classified as Dispersed Professional FBs is 
insignificant. 
4.2. Measuring financial performance 
We use profitability as the main variable to examine the effect of family and lone founder 
involvement on firm performance. Accounting-based measures of performance were used 
in this study because they focus on private firms (thus, no market-based data were 
available). Five firm level indicators were applied for the financial year ending in 2007 and 
2006. Return on assets (ROA) measures the ability of a firm’s  assets to generate profit, and 
it is considered to be a firm profitability indicator. This is in line with the work of Pérez-
González (2006), Arosa, Iturralde, and Maseda (2010) and Molly, Laveren, and Deloof 
(2010). ROA is calculated in three ways. In one approach, we use Operating Income plus 
Interest Expense divided by Total Assets (ROA1). In the second approach, we use 
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Operating Income scaled by Total Assets (ROA2). In the third approach, we use Operating 
income plus depreciation scaled by Total Assets (ROA3). We also determine Return on 
Equity (ROE) in line with Lindow, Stubner, and Wulf (2010), Blanco-Mazagatos, de 
Quevedo-Puente, and Castrillo (2007) and Maury (2006), which is calculated as Net 
Income divided by the book value of Equity (ROE1). ROA and ROE are the most widely 
used financial performance measures for unlisted FBs (Zellweger and Nason, 2008). 
Finally, we also measure cash-flow divided by the number of employees (CF EMPL) as a 
measure of productivity as performed by McConaughy, Matthews, and Fialko (2001). The 
other variables that were analysed were age, size and debt: Age as the record of the years 
since a firm´s inception; Size as the record of the book value of the total Assets of a firm; 
and Debt as the total Liabilities divided by the total Assets. Special comments are required 
about financial leverage and debt. First, Murphy (2005) determined that financial issues are 
deemed to be the most critical issues that are faced by private family firms. Specifically, 
raising capital was ranked as the most important financial issue. Second, this variable was 
analysed because family or lone founder involvement may influence a firm’s financial 
structure (López-Gracia and Sánchez-Andújar, 2007). Third, family members who are not 
actively involved in a firm might enforce the use of higher amounts of debt, as they can 
serve as a governance mechanism to prevent family managers from managerial 
opportunism, reducing agency costs (Blanco-Mazagatos, de Quevedo-Puente and Castrillo, 
2007; Molly, Laveren and Deloof, 2010).  
4.3. Descriptive Analysis 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for our sample of firms. It provides the number of 
firms, minimum and maximum values, means, standard deviations and Pearson´s 
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coefficient of variation. In general, the dispersion of non-quoted firms data is much higher 
than the data of public firms. Despite this fact, we decided to analyse only those variables 
with an acceptable relative dispersion degree to obtain more robust conclusions. For 
example, we decided to drop the CF EMPL variable because the Pearson`s CV is not 
around one, and with such dispersion statistical methods cannot detect significant 
differences. 
INSERT TABLE 3 
5. Research method and main results 
5.1. Univariate Analysis and the lone founder Effect 
After the data processing, an analysis was run to test the hypothesis. A parametric test 
(Student t test) and a non-parametric test (Mann-Whitney test) were used., Despite the fact 
the sample is large, procedures that are based on the mean are often sensitive to the 
occurrence of extreme or outlying observations, which is why so-called distribution free or 
a non-parametric method was also considered (Andersen, Jensen, and Kousgaard 1987). 
Specifically, as a first step, we considered family and lone founder firms in a single 
category, that is, we included as FBs, firms in which there was only the involvement of a 
lone founder but no involvement by any relatives as owners, managers or directors, and we 
applied univariate techniques to determine the results of the differences of the means tests 
between the following: 
 family owned firms and non-family owned firms to determine the relationship between 
family ownership and firm performance; 
 more diluted private owned FBs and more concentrated private family owned firms to 
test the relationship between family ownership concentration and firm performance; 
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 FBs that were managed by a family CEO and non-family owned firms to find out the 
relationship between family management and firm performance; 
 FBs that were managed by a family CEO and FBs that were managed by a non-family 
CEO to determine the relationship between family and professional management. 
As a second step, we applied the difference of means tests to the same former samples, but 
we excluded lone founder firms from the analysis (table 4). The results changed sharply, 
and consequently, the conclusions that were obtained also vary. Therefore, lone founder 
firms determine the findings achieved and whether they were considered to be an FB is one 
of the likely reasons why the literature has obtained contradictory results when comparing 
FBs and NFBs in terms of performance. 
INSERT TABLE 4 
To confirm the above finding and to test H1, we compare lone founder firms with the 
whole group of private family firms. Table 5 shows the results of the difference of means 
tests between both groups: 
INSERT TABLE 5 
We found significant differences in every variable that was studied. Lone founder firms are 
younger, smaller and more indebted than the rest of family owned firms. Moreover, these 
firms perform much better than family owned firms. In fact, all of the ROA and ROE 
variables show this same conclusion. Therefore, we confirm H1: lone founder firms 
outperform private family firms. As a result, lone founder firms determined the results that 
22 
 
were obtained about performance when we compared FBs and NFBs if they were included 
in any of the former groups.  
5.2 The interaction effects of family involvement in ownership and management on 
performance 
We have developed a parsimonious typology of FBs based on three components of family 
involvement –family ownership, ownership concentration and management- and grounded 
on agency theory. Table 6 presents descriptive information for our typology of firms; we 
prefer to leave out Dispersed Professional FBs because their number is negligible. Lone 
founder and Co-preneurial FB firms are the youngest firms, while Concentrated 
Professional FBs and Dispersed Non-Professional FBs are the oldest. In general, the same 
results were obtained for size; lone founder and Co-preneurial FB firms are smaller than 
the rest of the firms and Dispersed Non-Professional FBs and NFBs are the largest 
businesses. Lone founders also appear to use debt differently than the rest of the firms; lone 
founders finance 71% of their assets through debt financing. Dispersed Non-Professional 
FBs are on the opposite side; they only use debt to finance 58% of their total assets. Finally, 
in terms of performance, Dispersed Non-Professional FBs and lone founder firms 
outperform the rest of the firms in terms of every profitability measure that was used: 
ROA1, ROA2, ROA3 and ROE. The results were robust because they were similar for 2006 
and 2007. 
INSERT TABLE 6 
Spanish firms have a higher percentage of ownership concentration as compared with other 
industrialised countries (La Porta et al., 1998). Our sample of private Spanish firms also 
demonstrates this concentration. In spite of working with the same number of private firms 
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for every industry (construction, services and manufacturing) and size  (small, medium and 
large), just 2 and 29 firms of 1,890 (lone founder firms and FBs) could classify as 
Dispersed Professional and Dispersed Non Professional FBs, respectively. On the other 
hand, just 110 firms of 1,890 used professional services from an external CEO. 
To confirm the results achieved with descriptive and univariate analysis and to address the 
challenge that was proposed by Dyer (2006) about what type of FB leads to high 
performance and why, we applied Factor Analysis.  
5.3. Exploratory Factor Analysis 
To simplify and summarise the financial information that was obtained for lone founder 
and different types of FBs, we applied Factor Analysis to create a new smaller set of 
standardised variables. Seven raw variables (log AGE, log Size, DEBT, ROA1, ROA2, 
ROA3, ROE) were transformed and orthonormalised. Three components were identified 
and chosen, accounting for 79.50% of the total variance (Table 7).  
INSERT TABLE 7 
To label each component, we based them on the component loadings that were statistically 
more significant (table 8). The following descriptive labels were chosen: Profitability factor 
(FAC1); Size factor (FAC2); Debt factor (FAC3). 
INSERT TABLE 8 
Given that the number of firms that are classified as Dispersed Professional FB is 
negligible, we only worked with lone founders, four types of FBs and NFBs. When we 
compare the components that were identified through Factor Analysis, we obtained insight 
onto the features of lone founders and every type of FB (Figures 2 and 3). 
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INSERT FIGURES 2 Y 3 
Lone founders and Dispersed Professional FBs are the two superior performing firms, but 
these enviable results can be associated with very different average sizes and debts. While 
lone founder firms are the smallest and more indebted firms, Dispersed Professional FBs 
are the largest and have the lowest level of debt financing.  
Co-preneurial firms, Solely Family Run FBs and NFBs perform similarly, and they should 
be considered to be intermediate performing firms. Again, the strategy of growth and debt 
is completely dissimilar among them. As for size, Co-preneurial firms are smaller than 
Solely Family Run FBs, and the latter are smaller than NFBs. Regarding debt, Co-
preneurial firms are more indebted than NFBs, and the latter are more indebted than Solely 
Family Run FBs.  
Finally, the worst performing firms are Concentrated Professional FBs. Curiously, they 
have mid-range values, such as size and debt, with respect to superior and intermediate 
performing firms. 
5.4. Discussion 
The nature of an FB changes over time due to the development of the family and the firm. 
Therefore, to better understand the influence of family involvement in performance, we 
decided to analyse lone founders and every type of FB within their own contexts. After 
applying factorial analysis, we opted to analyse every type of FB using the ownership 
developmental dimension that was suggested by Gersick et al. (1997). We aimed to 
advance and highlight that lone founders and Dispersed Non-professional (Group I) FBs 
perform better than the rest of private FBs and NFBs (Groups II and III), but it is not the 
case with Co-preneurial firms (Group I). Therefore, H2a is nearly proved. On the other 
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hand, Solely Family Run FBs (Group II) outperformed Concentrated Professional FBs 
(Group III). Consequently, H2b is also confirmed.  
The ownership development dimension distinguishes three different stages: Controlling 
Owner, Sibling Partnership and Cousin Consortium. The ownership development 
dimension begins when ownership is completely controlled by one owner or, less typically, 
a married couple, and the owner usually makes all of  a  firm’s  decisions unilaterally. Thus, 
lone founders and Co-preneurial FBs are immersed in the Controlling Owner Stage. We 
argue that lone founder firms become the first superior performing firms because they are 
business and entrepreneurial orientated, and therefore, they have a higher capacity for 
growth. Lone founders possess unique skills and features, and they sustain a full 
identification with the company’s goals, values and long-term focus. Furthermore, from an 
agency theory point of view, lone founders bear no agency costs, and they are able to use 
their high financial leverage to generate a higher return on equity. Their high indebtedness 
is explained because they are willing to apply growth strategies, they are likely to be less 
risk adverse and they may consider bank debt to be convenient because financial 
institutions rarely interfere in business operations after lending.  
When two or more siblings enter a business with ownership control and they share decision 
making with a founder, the firms evolve to the Sibling Partnership stage. In general terms, 
we believe that Solely Family Run FBs may be functioning at this development stage. 
Regarding age, size and debt, Co-preneurial firms obtained intermediate values between 
lone founders and Solely Family Run FBs. We interpret that Co-preneurial FBs might 
represent a transitional situation between the Controlling Owner stage, in which a lone 
founder is the main character, and the Sibling Partnership stage, in which the family and the 
FB are growing and the family continues to occupy the main posts of the business (Solely 
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Family Run FBs). Solely Family Run FBs and Co-preneurial FBs obtain similar results 
regarding firm performance, but they are always lower than those that are obtained for lone 
founders and Dispersed Non-Professional FBs. It appears that the negative aspects of 
family ownership and management are initiated in the Co-preneurial stage, and they are 
also experienced by Solely Family Run firms. Both types of firms usually increase the 
number of family members that is involved in the business using informal or formal means. 
This increase might lead to conflicts (Davis and Harveston, 1999), shirking, free riding or 
the consumption of perks, an unwillingness to monitor family members, unskilled members 
of the family, or members who are less hard working and less able compared to the founder 
(Morck and Yeung, 2004). Furthermore, Solely Family Run FBs also have to cope with 
higher agency costs that arise from the expropriation of firm wealth at the expense of small 
shareholders (agency cost II). 
The final phase that closes the family business lifecycle is the Cousin Consortium, in which 
more family members are directly or indirectly involved in a business and/or private 
individuals are taking part the ownership or management of a firm. Decision making 
becomes shared by different family generations and even by non-family members. 
Consequently, this stage requires that family governance issues be addressed. We interpret 
that Concentrated Professional FBs and Dispersed Non-Professional FBs are situated in 
the Cousin Consortium stage. At this stage, we argue that some FBs choose to reduce some 
specific agency problems that are associated with family management, contracting a non-
family professional manager, despite coping with both traditional agency costs 
(Concentrated Professional FBs). Other firms also opt to prevent traditional agency 
problem number II (Dispersed Professional FBs). Lastly, other firms seek to minimise both 
types of traditional agency problems through non-professional management and ownership 
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dispersion (Dispersed Non-Professional FBs). In our sample, the Professional FB with 
concentrated ownership is the worst type of firm with respect to performance. It appears 
that negative effects from both traditional agency problems are stronger than the positive 
effects that can be gained by avoiding certain specific agency costs from family 
management. Given its poor performance, their lower debt may stem from an unwillingness 
by creditors to provide it. Some creditors may be not willing to provide debt to these new 
generations of FBs (Molly, 2010) because they pay less attention to reinvesting their 
retained earnings (Schwass, 2005).  
Finally, our second superior performing firms are Dispersed Non-Professional FBs. 
Although they share their noticeable good results regarding performance measures with 
lone founder firms, they are characterised by opposite characteristics with regard to size, 
age and debt. They are the least indebted firms and the biggest and oldest ones. Our results 
seem to confirm the conclusions of Galve-Gorriz and Salas-Fumás (2011) because the 
greater degree of investment of these FBs does not suppose a higher level of debt. These 
FBs appear to tend to increase the level of self-financing to finance their growth strategies. 
The results confirm the positive influence of not having considerable traditional agency 
costs, which is partially explained by the beneficial effect of having a more dispersed 
ownership, especially in Spain. Arosa, Iturralde, and Maseda (2010) suggested that 
minority shareholders enjoy weak investor protection in Spain and, therefore, the likelihood 
of expropriation is higher. Finally, it appears that the source of competitive advantage that 
is related to lower traditional agency costs actually overcomes the likely disadvantages 
from asymmetric altruism and more complex conflicts.  
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To summarise, given the special behaviour of lone founders and every type of FB, it seems 
essential to differentiate them when explaining the comparative performance between FBs 
and NFBs, and the different types of FBs. 
6. Conclusions 
This study separates the effect of family involvement per se from the idiosyncratic talent of 
the founder of a firm when explaining the comparative performance of private firms (Miller 
et al., 2007). Similarly, it explores certain types of private FB shape variations in firm 
economic performance (Westhead and Howorth, 2007) and how these variations are 
different from NFBs (Sharma, Chrisman and Gersick, 2012). A private firm taxonomy is 
elaborated, taking themes of family ownership and management structures and providing 
insights from how lone founders and each type of FB cope with their particular traditional 
agency costs. This theoretical firm classification was validated using a Spanish sample of 
private firms composed by 3,525 companies stratified by size and industry.  
Our analysis makes two main contributions to the extant literature. First, our work 
concludes that lone founder firms without family involvement outperform private family 
firms, and given their unique nature, they should be analysed independently when 
explaining the comparative performance of family and non-family private firms. Second, 
we also develop a parsimonious typology of private firms taking into account the lone 
founder effect and three components of family involvement—family ownership, ownership 
concentration and management. This study exploits the differentiation between the lone 
founder and family effects and the combination of the components of family involvement to 
show that firms that achieve to avoid or minimize traditional agency conflicts tend to 
outperform the firms that do not. As a result, we identify two superior performing firms: 
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lone founder firms and Dispersed Non-Professional FBs. It appears that because minority 
shareholders enjoy weak investor protection in Spain, the use of ownership dispersion, as a 
governance mechanism, shepherds and monitors progress on performance. Among FBs, at 
least in the sample studied, the conflict between owners and managers seems to be more 
costly that the conflict between majority and minority shareholders. In addition, specific 
agency costs and benefits to FBs (e.g., symmetrical or asymmetrical altruism) do not 
succeed in changing the foreseeable effects that are caused by traditional agency costs. 
Finally, we conclude that the inclusion of founder-led firms in FB samples and the 
treatment of private FBs as homogeneous entities may have been the cause for the 
contradictory results when comparing FBs and NFBs with regard to performance. 
Furthermore, we suggest that not all private FBs are alike derived from the ways in which 
each type of FB adresses agency costs, and as a consequence, their expected performance 
might be different. Therefore, this paper sheds light on the former confused performance 
results within private FBs.  
Our findings have several implications for practitioners. Our study may provide additional 
guidelines for consultants who are concerned with the survival and prosperity of their 
companies, as this paper identifies the types of superior performing private firms and their 
governance profiles. By identifying the higher-performing types of private firms, families 
may augment their investment returns. Furthermore, practitioners can encourage 
underperforming firms to progress toward incorporating the specific governance structures 
of higher-performing private FBs. Specifically, after the first stage in which the ownership 
and management is completely controlled by one owner (lone founder), true FBs should 
evolve into firms with a more dispersed ownership and family management (Dispersed 
Non-Professional FBs) to continue to obtain excellent business performance.  
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This study is not free from limitations, and future research implications may be proposed. 
Agency theory tends to ignore that FBs have non-economic goals that might lead to 
outcomes and decisions that are substantially different from NFBs, whereas the role of non-
economic goals is less essential (Chrisman et al., 2012). As agency theory taken alone 
cannot completely explain performance differences, future research should combine the use 
of complementary theories. Because FBs have economic and non-economic goals, variables 
should not only refer to financial returns, but they should also consider the level of 
underlying vision, attitudes, and intentions of the controlling family (Gomez-Mejía et al., 
2007). Finally, researchers should conduct similar investigations in other countries to 
increase the validity of the findings. 
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Group I    
Lone founder No No + 
Co-preneurial FB Low Low + 
Dispersed Non-Professional FB Low Low + 
Group II    
Solely Family Run FB Low High ? 
Dispersed Professional FB High Low ? 
Dispersed Non-Family Business High Low ? 
Group III    
Concentrated Professional FBs High High - 
Concentrated Non-Family Business High High - 
 
(*)   “+”   is   positive   effect   on   performance   because   of   no   or   lower   both   agency   costs;;   “-”   is  
negative effect on performance because  of  higher  both  agency  costs;;  and  “?”  is  unknown  effect  
because it is not known a priori whether positive effect on performance of low agency problem I 
or agency problem II will be < or = or > that negative effect on performance of high agency cost 
II or agency problem I, respectively.  
 

























































































Table 1 Agency costs and benefits from family and lone founder involvement 
Family Ownership  Family management Lone founder Effect 
Lower agency costs 






(specific lower agency 
cost I) 
Higher agency costs 
due to expropriation 
firm wealth at the 




Lower agency costs due 
to goals alignment 
between agent and 
principal (lower 
traditional agency cost 
I) 






higher agency cost I) 
No traditional agency 
costs I and II 
  Lower agency costs due 
to superior expertise, 
commitment, long-term 
focus, lower executive 
compensation (specific 
lower agency cost I) 
 
 
Higher agency costs due 
to more complex conflicts 
between those family 
members who lead the 
firm and other family 
owners - shirking, free 
riding, consumption of 
perks- (specific higher 
agency cost I)  
Unique skills and 
characteristics, 
commitment, long-term 
focus, strong values and 
trust, freedom from family 
succession issues and 
kinship squabbles, among 
others features, avoid 
specific agency problems  
  Lower agency costs due 
to symmetrical altruism  
-better communication 
and cooperation- 































Table 2 Number and percentage of lone founders, FBs types and NFBs (n= 3525) 
Type/Industry Total % Total Firms % Total Family Firms 
Lone Founder 931 26.41%  
Co-preneurial FB 145 4.11% 15.12% 
Solely Family Run FB 675 19.15% 70.39% 
Dispersed non-professional FB 29 0.82% 3.02% 
Concentrated Professional FB 108 3.06% 11.26% 
Dispersed professional FB 2 0.06% 0.21% 
Total Family firms 959 27.21% 100.00% 
Non family-firms 1,635 46.38%  





































Table 3 Summary Statistics for the Full Sample (2007) 
  Min. Max. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Pearson`s CV 
 ROA1  - 0.21 0.31 0.05 0.06 1.18 
 ROA2  - 0.26 0.40 0.06 0.08 1.27 
 ROA3  - 0.32 0.52 0.10 0.09 0.91 
 ROE1  - 0,60 1.23 0.17 0.22 1.32 
 CF EMPL  - 183.90 362.19 16.20 30.31 1.87 
 Log AGE  - 4.67 2.68 0.75 0.28 
 Log SIZE   2.94 15.64 8.90 2.10 0.24 
 DEBT  - 1.89 0.70 0.23 0.33 




































Table 4 Results of difference of Means Tests excluding lone founder from the analysis (2007) 
 Variables/Tests Family owned –non 
family owned firms 
Concentrated-Dispersed 
FBs 
Family CEO firms and 
non-family owned firms 
Family and non-family 
CEO firms 
















1 Log AGE ≠ = ≠ ≠ ≠ = ≠ ≠ 
2 Log SIZE  ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ = ≠ ≠ 
3 DEBT ≠ = ≠ ?? ≠ ≠ ?? = 
4 ROA1 ?? = = ?? ≠ = ≠ ?? 
5 ROA2 ≠ = = ?? ≠ = ≠ ?? 
6 ROA3 ≠ = = = ≠ = ≠ ≠ 
7 ROE  ≠ = = = ≠ = ≠ ?? 
(*)  ≠  means significant differences at 1%***, 5%** or 10% *level;  
     = means there are not significant differences;  
    ?? means we have some doubts about whether exist or not differences because T-student test results ≠ Kruskal-Wallis test results; 

































Table 5 Difference of Means Tests between lone founder firms and Family owned firms (2007) 
    Lone Founder firms (N=865) 






    Mean Standard Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation       
1 Log AGE 2.49 0.67 2.85 0.61 0.000 0.000 ≠ 
2 Log SIZE 7.79 1.66 8.88 1.90 0.000 0.000 ≠ 
3 DEBT 0.70 0.21 0.65 0.21 0.000 0.000 ≠ 
4 ROA1 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.000 0.001 ≠ 
5 ROA2 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.002 0.004 ≠ 
6 ROA3 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.003 0.028 ≠ 
7 ROE 0.19 0.20 0.13 0.16 0.000 0.000 ≠ 
(*)  ≠  means  significant  differences. 

































Table 6 Descriptive Statistics (2007) 
Type/Variables Total % Log AGE Log SIZE DEBT ROA1 ROA2 ROA3 ROE1 
Lone Founder 931 26.41 2.47 7.73 0.71 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.19 
Co-preneurial FB 145 4.11 2.67 8.11 0.69 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.15 
Solely Family Run 
FB 675 19.15 2.84 8.84 0,66 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.14 
Dispersed non-
professional FB 29 0.82 3.17 10.13 0.58 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.15 
Concentrated 
Professional FB 108 3.06 2.96 9.57 0.66 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.10 
Dispersed 
professional FB 2 0.06 2.90 9.70 0.59 0.07 0.08 0.20 0.17 
Non family-firms 1,635 46.38 2.82 9.83 0.66 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.13 
Total 3,525  100.00    2.73 9.01 0.68 0.05 0,06 0.10 0.15 


































Table 7 Total Variance Explained 






1 3.35 37.225 37.225 
2 2.343 26.033 63.258 
3 1.462 16.241 79,5 




























Table 8 Performance and control variables: varimax rotated components Matrix (2006 and 2007) 
  Varimax rotated components 2007 Varimax rotated components 2006 
Variables 1 2 3 1 2 3 
log AGE -0.087 0.432 -0.523 -0.087 0.432 -0.523 
log SIZE -0.059 0.978 -0.051 0.052 0.980 -0.028 
DEBT -0.171 -0.001 0.944 -0.244 0.020 0.924 
ROA1 0.827 -0.018 -0.127 0.852 0.011 -0.026 
ROA3 0.835 -0.118 -0.153 0.863 -0.079 -0.110 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
